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Although perhaps harsh in its specific results, the instant decision was justified by what the Court views as a compelling interest: the preservation of
judicial resources. Optimally, this decision will stimulate congressional enactment of long overdue improvements in class action legislation. However, unless
measures revitalizing class actions and appellate access are legislated, the broad
holding in the instant case may signal erosion of interlocutory appeal capability
and a return to the injustices inherent in strict compliance with the final judgment rule.
LILmAN REYES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LAND USE REGULATION: YOU DON'T
HAVE TO TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT
Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York,
98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978)
In 1969, the financially troubled petitioner, Penn Central Transportation
Company,' entered into a lucrative leasing arrangement 2 that involved the
construction of a multi-story office building above Grand Central Terminal.3
Penn Central's plans were thwarted when New York City's Landmark Preservation Committee4 withheld approval for development, ruling that the proposed
1. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20
(1975). Penn Central's financial difficulty resulted in insolvency and bankruptcy. Id. at 270,

377 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
2. In January 1968, Penn Central entered into a lease and sublease arrangement with
U.G.P. Properties, Inc. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2655
(1978). Under the terms of the lease U.G.P. was to construct and operate a multi-story
office building over Grand Central Terminal. During the period of construction U.G.P. was
to pay $1,000,000 per year. After completion Penn Central was guaranteed at least $3,000,000
rental per year, with the possibility of additional rents based upon actual space leased.
U.G.P. was also to assume a portion of Penn Central's property taxes estimated at $600,000
per annum. The net financial benefit would have reflected a reduction of approximately
$700,000 to $1,000,000 in lost rents from concessionaires whose space would be affected by
structural changes in the terminal. The term of the lease was 50 years and included an
option retained by U.G.P. for an additional 25 years. Brief for appellant at 5, Penn. Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978).
3. Since 1913 Grand Central Terminal has been a tribute to New York, combining
function as a mass transportation center and form as a classic example of French Beaux
Art. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3-4, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978).
4. Grand Central Terminal was designated a historical landmark in August 1967, under
the New York City Landmark Preservation Law. N.Y.C. Charter §2004; N.Y.C. ADMIN.
CODE ch. 8-A §§205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (Supp. 1970), reprinted in Jurisdictional Statement app.
at 76, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2640 (1978). The charter
establishes an 11 member Landmarks Preservation Commission to designate "improvements
which are 30 years old or older and have a special character, or special historical or aesthetic
interest or value, as part of the development heritage or cultural characteristics of the

city, state or nation." Id. §207-1.0(o). Under the provisions of the landmark law the Commission must approve any proposed alteration to the designated structure prior to construction. Id. §§207-4.0-9.0. For a discussion of New York City's landmark law, see Rankin,
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addition was incompatible with the character and design of the terminal
despite the plan's compliance with existing zoning regulations.5 Contending
that these landmark restrictions constituted a taking of its air rights6 in
violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments,7 Penn Central sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the New York Supreme Court.8 Focusing on the
detrimental economic impact of the regulation, the court declared the New
York City Landmark Preservation Law unconstitutional as applied. 9 A
divided Appellate Division10 disagreed, indicating that without complete
deprivation of all beneficial use of the terminal, there could be no "taking." 1
Affirming, the Court of Appeals of New York 2 found that Penn Central had
failed to demonstrate an inability to earn a reasonable return's from terminal
operations as a result of the restrictions, reasoning that the transfer development rights 14 granted sufficiently mitigated the regulation's adverse financial
Operation and Interpretation of New York City Landmarks Preservation Law, 36 L. &
PRoB. 366 (1971).
5. 98 S. Ct. at 2655.
6. Brief for Appellants at 4. The substance of Penn Central's complaint was that it
was barred from construction of an office building over its terminal and as such had its
air rights taken without just compensation.
7. US. CONSr. amends. V & XIV.
8. Jurisdictional Statement app. at 51. Penn Central also sought monetary damages for
the temporary taking of its property from the period of designation as a landmark to the
time when the restrictions were lifted. This issue was severed from the constitutional issue.
Id. at 60.
9. Id. at 71.
10. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20
(1975) (3-2 decision).
11. Id. at 274, 377 N.Y.S.2d 29 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962);
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958)).
12. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977).
13. Id. at 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921. New York City's Landmark
Preservation Law provides special treatment for owners of structures who can demonstrate, inter alia, that the property is not capable of generating a reasonable return.
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A §207-8.0-2, reprinted in Jurisdictional Statement app. at 76.
New York State Judicial authority similarly mandates that land use restrictions may not
deprive a landowner of a reasonable return. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
42 N.Y.2d 324, 331, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 918 (1977) (citing French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 596, 350 N.E. 2d 381, 386 385 N.Y.S.2d 5,
10 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 US. 990 (1976)). However, the court noted that "reasonable
return" was an elusive concept. 42 N.Y.2d 331, 366 N.E.2d at 1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
Recognizing that Penn Central's investments in the terminal and surrounding properties
had increased in value as a result of favorable governmental assistance, the court determined that this "public increment" should be segregated from the private investment before
computation of a reasonable return. The rationale was that Penn Central benefited from
tax exempt status and favorable city subway and bus route scheduling, and therefore was
not entitled to reap a return on this social investment. Id. at 332-33, 366 N.E.2d at 1275-76,
397 N.Y.S.2d at 918-19. See Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central
Terminal Decision, 91 HARV. L. Rav. 402, 415-18 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Disparity
Issue]. See generally Costonis, Fair Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes
for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1039-42 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Fair Compensation].
14. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 335, 366 N.E.2d 1271,

CONTEMP.
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effects. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed and HELD,
that the application of the New York City Landmark Preservation Law did
not effect an unconstitutional taking of petitioner's property 15
"Taking" jurisprudence has traditionally involved the examination of two
fundamentally different governmental powers used extensively to achieve
a myriad of social goals.'- Government, through its police power authority,
may regulate and otherwise restrict land use in furtherance of the public
health, safety or welfare without recompense to the owner.1 On the other
hand, private property may be acquired for public use through an exercise of
eminent domain' accompanied by the payment of just compensation. 19 While
either police power or eminent domain can be used successfully to achieve a
given social objective, the procedure chosen becomes of vital importance to
both the property owner and the taxpayer. Of little guidance is the fifth
amendment 2 which merely provides that no property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.2 ' The taking issue, therefore, is formulated to question: at what point do restrictions on land, implemented through
police power, so deprive an owner of property as to be a constructive exercise
of eminent domain requiring payment of just compensation.
In the early leading case of Mugler v. Kansas,22 the Supreme Court
examined the interrelationships between police power, eminent domain and
the fourteenth amendment. 23 The owner of a brewery maintained that the
state had deprived him of his property without due process when a statute
prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating liquors rendered his facilities
virtually without value. The Court examined the character of the govern1278, 397 N.YS.2d 914, 921 (1977). Transfer development rights (TDRs) represent a restricted landowner's opportunity to further develop other property in lieu of lost development potential as a consequence of regulation. The New York Landmark Preservation Law
provides owners with TDRs measured by the difference between the development potential
of the vacant parcel and the extent to which a landmark is already developed. Furthermore,
an owner may sell these TDRs to other property owners desiring to extend the development
of their land. See Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
372 (1971). See also Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE
L.J. 75 (1973); Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338, 349-

59 (1972).
15. 98 S. Ct. at 2666.
16. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 US. 50 (1976) (zoning ordinance
restricting concentration of adult theatres); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (eminent
domain exercised for urban redevelopment); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201
N.V.2d 761 (1972) (restriction on development to preserve natural state of land).
17. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
18. FtE ND, PoLcE PowEI §1 (1904). Eminent domain is one of four great powers of
the state. The others are war, taxation, and the police power. Id.
19. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The "Takings Clause" provides that "private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."
20. Id.
21. The fifth amendment was extended to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
235-41 (1897).
22. 123 US. 623 (1887).
23. See note 21 supra. The fifth amendment was not held applicable to the states until
1897.
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ment's actions as a means of distinguishing between eminent domain and
25
police power.2 4 Finding that there had been no appropriation of the property

and that the owner's right to control, dispose of, and use the land for lawful
purposes remained undisturbed,2 6 the Court concluded that the principles of
eminent domain were not involved. Instead the Court stressed the state's
authority to prescribe regulations to protect the public and promote the
general welfare. Viewing the police power as plenary and subject only to fifth
amendment constraints, 2' the Mugler Court dismissed the petitioner's claim
for compensation, reasoning that the state should not be burdened with an
obligation to make restitution for losses resulting from restrictions placed
on the noxious use of land.2 Moreover, the Court noted that the primary role
of the fourteenth amendment is to preclude government from arbitrarily
placing restrictions on property rights and to ensure that regulations are not
imposed as a pretext for acquiring property for public use without compensa29

tion.

In 1922 these concepts were altered considerably by the Supreme Court
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.3° The state of Pennsylvania, acting to
preclude widespread damage from land subsidence, prohibited mining of
subsurface coal in populated areas. 31 The coal company maintained that these
restrictions on its reserved mining rights3 2 were a deprivation of its property

without just compensation. In direct contravention to Mugler, the Court
severely constricted the police power and held that the mining restriction was
tantamount to a "taking."
24. 123 U.S. at 666-69. The distinction between these two powers was clear. If the
government appropriated or physically invaded land it was eminent domain; otherwise it
was an exercise of police power. See generally F. BossE.MAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE
TAKING ISSUE 105-23 (1973).
25. 123 U.S. at 669.
26. Id. The Court indicated that the action was simply a prohibition upon the noxious
use of land and could not be deemed a "taking" for public use. Id.
27. Id. at 659-65. Justice Harlan was a champion of a strong police power. See generally
F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra note 24, at 118-20.
28. 123 U.S. at 669. The prohibition upon the noxious use of land has been viewed
as the traditional justification for imposing restrictions which result in severe adverse
economic consequences. This rationale has been considerably altered by the instant case.

See note 78 infra.
29. Id. at 663.
30. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
31. See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D.

CALLIES

& J.

BANTA,

supra note 24, at 126-30. The

Act was passed to protect municipalities within the 5,000 square mile anthracite coal region
of northeastern Pennsylvania. The largest city in the region was Scranton, with a population
of 137,000. Mine subsidence, which is the collapse of the land surface, resulted from the
removal of subsurface coal. Coal companies had mined in the area for 200 years but did
not have the techniques for such complete coal extraction until after World War 1. The
Act prohibited the mining of coal so as to cause subsidence of public streets and buildings,
transportation routes, dwellings, places of work and cemetaries. Id.

32. The coal company originally owned much of the land in the region and conveyed
the land to individuals and municipalities specifically reserving the mining rights. Id.
Because the state prohibited the mining of coal from under the land which the company

had previously sold, the subsurface and mineral rights inured to the landowners without
compensation to the coal company. 260 U.S. at 415.
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Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, juxtaposed police power and
eminent domain on a single continuum and declared the primary distinction
33
between these two powers to be a matter of degree. The Court focused on
the extent to which the restrictions impaired the value of the property rights.
Reasoning that these mining rights were valuable only to the extent that they
enabled the coal company to exact a profit, the Court concluded that the
regulation promulgated under the authority of the, police power so extensively
diminished the value of the rights as to be equivalent to a taking of property
34
Although the
more appropriately exercised through eminent domain.
regulation,
some
to
subject
majority recognized that all property is implicitly
beyond
threshold
the Court asserted that the fifth amendment established a
which police power restrictions could not extend without a transformation
35
into constructive exercise of eminent domain. The Court completed its
analysis by balancing the public interest against the magnitude of the harm
to private property rights and concluded that these restrictions can be imposed
only if accompanied by the payment of just compensation.36
33. 260 U.S. at 416. The Court stated that "[w]hen [the extent of diminution in value]
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent
domain and compensation to sustain the act." Id. at 413. The diminution in value test has
been incorporated in the decisions of modern courts as the sole factor or in conjunction
with other considerations in determining whether there has been an unconstitutional taking.
See Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427, 1477 (1978). The inherent
impreciseness of the principle has led to varying determinations of the magnitude of
economic harm requisite for finding a "taking." r4. at 1480. Although the absence of a
specific standard has been viewed as an equitable feature of the principle, its application
in light of varying concepts of what constitutes property rights has been criticized. See
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 50-51 (1964). Other commentators
have severely criticized Justice Holmes for departing from the absolute exercise of police
power expoused in Mugler. Strong proponents of land use regulation have found that this
decision has created a considerable obstacle. See F. BOSSEL IAN, D. CALIJES & J. BANTA,
supra note 24, at 118-20. The economic impact of restrictions on landowners was maintained
as a significant factor by the Supreme Court in the instant case. See text accompanying
note 71 infra.

34. 260 U.S. at 413. The Court recognized that the mining rights were valuable only
to the extent that the land could be mined to provide a profit. Justice Holmes likened
this prohibition to an appropriation or destruction of the coal company's property. Id. at
414.
35. Id. at 413. The Court summarized: "The general rule, at least, is that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." Id. at 415.
36. Id. at 413. The Court concentrated upon the potential damage to the single private
dwelling of the respondent. Reasoning that similar damage to others within the area
would not create a public nuisance, the Court concluded that the public interest in the
private dispute between the litigants was not warranted. Furthermore, Justice Holmes
negated any police power justifications, first by noting that the damage would not be
common to the public since those who owned both the surface and mineral rights were
exempt from the prohibition, and secondly by determining that notice to the landowners
would preclude any threat to safety. Therefore, he felt that the public interest was small
in relation to the extent of the harm to the coal company. Id. at 414. The Court indicated
that at the time eminent domain was exercised for the purchase of property for streets,
the state and city should have purchased the subsurface rights as well. Id. at 415. Since
private persons and communities assumed a risk when they chose to acquire only the
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Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Pennsylvania Coal37 criticized the majority's

narrow focus on the value of the subsurface mining rights. Noting that all
values are relative, Justice Brandeis urged that the Court examine the value
of the land as a whole 38 indicating that aggregate property rights can be so
partitioned as to create a "taking" as a consequence of any regulation. Of
critical concern to Justice Brandeis was the majority's contention that justification for the police power required a mutuality of advantage between the
39
community and the land owner. Justice Brandeis conceded that this reciprocity may be essential if the purpose of a regulation is to confer benefits
throughout the community. However, he echoed Mugler declaring that constraints should not be placed on the government when acting in furtherance
of the public safety. 40
This average reciprocity of advantage rationale4l was implicitly adopted
by the Supreme Court in 1926 as the justification for utilizing the police power
42
to restrict land use in conjunction with a general community zoning plan.
43
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the market value of unimproved

44
property held for future industrial use declined seventy-five percent when
an ordinance restricted its development to residential purposes. The Court,
relying on principles of nuisance law, focused primarily on the legitimate
45
scope of police power. The town's zoning plan was perceived as a compre-

hensive approach to protecting the community's welfare by regulating the
surface rights, the fact that the danger inherent in the risk had developed did not entitle
them to greater rights than were purchased. Id. at 416.
37. 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 419. Justice Brandeis stated that any meaningful analysis must include the
value of the entire parcel of land. Without considering the value of the surface properties
and the coal not subject to prohibition, it would be possible to conclude that the sum
of the divided interests could be greater than the whole. Id.
39. Id. at 415 (citing Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914)). In
Plymouth Coal, a statute which required that coal companies mining on adjacent properties
maintain a pillar of coal between shafts was upheld as constitutional. The rationale used to
justify the exercise of police power in the absence of a danger to the public was that both
companies benefited from the preclusion of potential damage as a result of the mutual
restrictions.
40. Id. at 422 (citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibition of brickyard); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (prohibition of livery stable); Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (prohibition of brewery)). Justice Brandeis noted that
there was no reciprocity of advantage enjoyed by these owners whose property had been
restricted to protect the public unless it was the benefits shared by being part of a
civilized community. He concluded that the coal company also benefited in this way. Id.
41. See Developments, supra note 33, at 1492-93.
42. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The ordinance at
issue provided for the division of a large area of the village into height, area and use
districts. Id. at 380. With the utilization of a zone map, the entire area was "zoned" using
combinations of these designations. Id. at 383.
43. Id.
44. ld. at 384. Ambler Realty Co. owned a 68-acre tract of land and alleged that the
market value would decline from $10,000 to not more than $2,500 per acre as a result of
the restriction. Id.
45. Id. at 386. The Court declared that zoning ordinances "must find their justification
in some aspect of the police power asserted for the public welfare." Id. at 387.
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advancement of industry into the' area. 46 Accordingly, the Court reasoned
that an incidental restriction of a harmless use of land would not invalidate
47
what was otherwise a legitimate attempt to achieve a broad public objective.
Reiterating the role of the fourteenth amendment expounded in Mugler, the
Court declared that absent a clear indication that the ordinance was arbitrary,
unreasonable or unrelated to the public welfare, the community, not the
judiciary, was in the best position to formulate a legislative remedy. Concluding that the general application of zoning restrictions was well within the
range of the police power, the Court dismissed the claims of decline in market
value and diminished expectations as insufficient to sustain the constitutional
challenge. 48
In 1954 the Supreme Court vastly expanded the parameters of the police
power in Berman v. Parker49 by incorporating aesthetic values into traditional notions of public welfare.50 Although Berman actually involved a
51
the Court,
constitutional challenge to the exercise of eminent domain,
in an unprecedented approach, relied extensively upon an analysis of the
police power to justify the acquisition of buildings pursuant to an urban redevelopment plan. 52 Noting that concepts of public welfare were broad and
inclusive,53 the Court declared that enhancement of the qualitative aspects
of life, in addition to conventional notions of protecting the public, merited
46. Id. at 392.

47. Id. "The harmless may sometimes be brought in within the regulation or prohibition in order to abate or destroy the harmful." Id.
48. Id. at 395-97. The Court noted that application of any specific provision of the
ordinance may subsequently be proven arbitrary or unreasonable and thus found unconstitutional. Accord, Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (prohibiting
municipality from applying an otherwise constitutional zoning ordinance which was not
shown to have a substantial relationship to the public interest).
49. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
50. The Berman decision has had a tremendous impact in initiating the trend towards
the utilization of zoning for aesthetic purposes. See Developments, supra note 33, at 1447-50.
51. Pursuant to the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, a public agency
was formed and granted the power of eminent domain to acquire all the property within
large areas of the city found to contain high concentrations of slums and substandard
housing. Once the project area had been purchased, property designated for public use
was transferred to an appropriate governmental agency and the remainder of the property
within the area was sold in its entirety to a private redevelopment company for renovation
and resale. Berman, the owner of a department store within a project area, contested the
acquisition of his building as a violation of the fifth amendment. He alleged that his
property was not taken for public use as constitutionally required because: (1) his
building was not a slum and did not constitute a nuisance, (2) it was taken solely for the
development of a more attractive, well balanced community, and (3) it was to be under
the authority of a private enterprise, not a public agency. 348 U.S. at 31.
52. Id. at 32. The Court stated: "We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has
been known as the police power." Id. It is not clear why the Court used the police power
to justify an exercise of eminent domain. One of two hypotheses is that the Court interchanged the concepts of "public purpose" required for the police power, and "public use"
as specified in the fifth amendment. The second interpretation, more literal but less
plausible, is that the Court viewed eminent domain as a means of fulfilling the broader
public purpose under police power. See Fair Compensation, supra note 13, at 1036-37.

63. 348 UjS. at 33.
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recognition as justifications for the employment of police power. Reaffirming
54
judicial deference to legislative determinations of public welfare, the Court
further strengthened the government's authority to enact such restrictions.
Because Berman was an eminent domain proceeding and did not involve
a regulation of land use, the Court was not compelled to consider the
attendant economic consequences of an application of police power. Recognizing that the constitutional requisite of just compensation accompanied the
eminent domain proceedings, the Court considered the rights of the property
5
owners satisfied. The Supreme Court did address the significance of the magnitude of
56
economic harm in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead. Comingling discordant
5s
57
concepts of both Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal, the Court upheld a
safety ordinance which prohibited the existing and presumably all future
commercial use of the property.5 9 Citing Mugler the Court affirmed that a
deprivation of the most beneficial use of the land is justified when existing
uses are prejudicial to the public interest. 60 Despite its reliance on traditional
police power doctrine which disregards consequential economic harm, the
the existence
Court reiterated the principles of Pennsylvania Coal, confirming
61
of limitations on regulations found to be too onerous.
The instant case continued the consolidation of concepts prominent in
Goldblatt and furnished a model for the analysis of "taking" jurisprudence.
In determining whether police power or eminent domain is the appropriate
vehicle for the achievement of a given social objective, the Court focused on:
(1) the character of governmental action, (2) the extent to which the regula54. Id. at 32. "Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive." Id. For a discussion of this decision's chilling effect on constitutional challenges to eminent domain,
see Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court
Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. Cr. REv. 63, 70; Comment, The Public Use Limitation in
Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
55. 348 U.S. at 36.
56. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
57. See text accompanying notes 22-29 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 30-40 supra.
59. 369 U.S. at 596. Goldblatt had operated a commercial sand and gravel excavation
company on a 38-acre tract within the city of Hempstead since 1927. Due to the area's
shallow water table, the excavation filled with water during its first year of operation and
developed into a 20-acre lake with an average depth of 25 feet. The ordinance required
that Goldblatt refill any excavation below the water table and prohibited further excavation below that level. It was shown not only that further excavation on the 20-acre lake
was prohibited but that due to the geology of the remaining 18-acre tract and the
necessity of its use for processing operations, the entire mining utility of the area was
negated.
60. Id. at 592. Furthermore, the Court enumerated factors useful for an evaluation
of the validity of police power, including: (1) the interest of the public which requires
interference with private property, (2) the efficiency of the means used to satisfy the
purpose in light of the alternatives, (3) the nature and extent of the interference, and
(4) the financial loss resulting from the regulation. The absence of relevant evidence,
however, precluded the application of these criteria. Id. at 595.
61. Id. at 594. (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
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tions interfere with the use of property, and (3) the resultant economic

impact. 62
The Court's examination of the character of governmental action was a
regeneration, within a modified framework, of the traditional substantive
distinctions between police power and eminent domain as perceived in
Mugler.63 According to the Court, the exercise of eminent domain is
appropriate whenever government in its proprietory role seeks and utilizes
private resources pursuant to an enterprise function. 64 On the other hand,
the use of police power is warranted when government, acting as a mediator
among various social interests implements a program which adjusts benefits
and burdens in accord with community goals.65 However, the mere fact that
governmental action is consistent with an application of the police power
will not preclude the finding of a "taking."6 6
The Court examined next the extent to which the instant regulation
interfered with the use of petitioner's property. In contrast to Pennsylvania
Coal's analysis6 7 incorporating the severance of constituent property rights,
the Court focused upon the parcel of land as a whole.68 Finding that the
present use of the property was maintained and that the remaining uses
appeared consistent with Penn Central's expectations 69 when purchasing the
62. 98 S. Ct. at 2663.
63. Id. at 2659. Although the Court expressly rejected the contention that physical
governmental control over property was required to find a "taking," it employed a test
that focused upon governmental actions which were effective acquisitions of private resources for public use. See Sax, supra note 33, at 62-63.
64. 98 S. Ct. at 2661 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (government
using air rights for flight of its planes).
65. Id. at 2659. The Court's characterization of the New York City Landmark Preservation Law squarely meets this criteria. The Court noted that New York's law is typical of
similar acts which encourage preservation by private owners through the use of incentives
rather than acquisitions. "While the law does place special restrictions on landmark properties as a necessary feature to the attainment of its larger objectives, the major theme of the
act is to ensure the owners of 'any such properties both a 'reasonable return' on their investments and maximum latitude to use their parcels for purposes not inconsistent with
the preservation goals." Id. at 2652. Additionally, the Landmark Commission is representative of the community (containing at least one resident from each of the city's five
boroughs) and hearings give all interested persons an opportunity to be heard (80 witnesses
testified in four days of hearings to determine the appropriateness of the proposed alterations to Grand Central Terminal). Judicial proceedings were available to contest the decisions of any administrative hearing. Furthermore, transfer development rights were made
available to help offset any adverse financial consequences. Id. at 2652-54.
66. Id. at 2665.
67. See 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (mineral rights considered separately). See also text accompanying note 38 supra.
68. 98 S. Ct. at 2663. In rejecting Penn Central's contention that it had been deprived
of its "air rights" the Court stated that "'[t]aking' jurisprudence does not divide a single
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated." Id. Which property interests are protected under
the fifth amendment, however, has not been clear. See AcKRMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1977).
69. Id. at 2666. The Court viewed the decision in Pennstylvania Coal as representing the
protection of distinct investment backed expectations. Id. at 2663 n.27. Whereas the coal
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land, the Court concluded that the restrictions were not too exacting. Additionally, the Court determined that neither the complete exploitation of
potential land development nor the most beneficial use of the land are protected under the fifth amendment.70
Finally, when the adverse economic impact on the private property owner
outweighs the benefits which accrue to the public as a consequence of the
regulation, deprivation of the use of property may require compensation.71
In the instant case, the Court found Grand Central Terminal to be a profitable operation providing its owners with a reasonable return on their investment.7 2 Moreover, the Court gave great weight to the transfer development
rights7 3 furnished as a form of compensation, thus mitigating the financial
4
burden which Penn Central would otherwise bear3
company's sole expectation in reserving the mineral rights was their exploitation, the Court
in the instant case found that Penn Central's primary expectation, the terminal's operation,
was not impaired.
70. Id. at 2660-62.
71. Id. at 2665 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 399 (1922)). The
Court retained Justice Holmes' distinction that the difference between the police power
and eminent domain is a matter of degree. Id.
72. Id. at 2666. The record is neither dispositive of Grand Central's actual results of
operations nor of Penn Central's reasonable return on its investment. The Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of New York took exception to the financial statements
submitted, noting that there had not been a sufficient segregation of real estate and railroad
operations in addition to other errors in expense and revenue allocations. Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 273, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 28 (1975).
The Court of Appeals of New York, utilizing the social benefit theory, noted that the public
component of Grand Central's value was not segregated. See note 13 supra. Additionally,
the court found Grand Central Terminal analogous to a flagship store and insisted that the
incremental increase in value of Penn Central's surrounding properties be imputed to the
terminal's operations. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 333, 366
N.E.2d 1271, 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 919 (1977).
The Court in the instant case noted that the New York Court of Appeals' judgment
rested upon bases which merited affirmance and thus chose not to address the application
of the "social increment" theory. Furthermore, Penn Central did not seek review of the
lower court's determination that it could not earn a reasonable return. 98 S. Ct. at 2658 n.23.
73. 98 S. Ct. at 2666. See note 14 supra. New York zoning laws originally restricted
the transfer of development rights (TDRs) to contiguous building sites held in common
ownership. In 1968, the city of New York expanded the number of potential recipient sites
by permitting transfer to adjacent lots, thus allowing transfer to contiguous sites across
streets and intersections. The following year, the law was amended to extend the application of TDRs to sites in any chain of common ownership when an adjacent lot was the
first link. Additionally, regulations which previously restricted the application of TDRs
at sites which had already been completely developed were relaxed to enable Penn Central
to transfer all of its unused development potential to a single site.
At the time of trial, Penn Central owned eight potential recipient sites for the TDRs
and in negotiations for leases and sales of these properties in 1970 and 1971, evidence
indicated that they could be worth as much as $3.5 million. See Brief for Appellees at 32,
98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978). See generally Marcus, supra note 14; The Disparity Issue, supra
note 13, at 418-21.
74. 98 S. Ct. at 2666. The Court of Appeals of New York stated that the transfer
development rights were "fair compensation" for the loss of rights above the terminal. Due
to the fact that Penn Central failed to show that there had been a "taking," the constitutionality of providing such non-monetary compensation as a substitute for the constitutional

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol31/iss2/7

10

Paull: Constitutional Law: Land Use Regulation: You Don't Have to Take i
19791

CASE COMMENTS

Arguing that the record did not support the value of these transfer rights
as just compensation required in a "taking," the minority75 perceived the
majority's position as an impairment of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Citing precedent requiring compensation for air rights destroyed in

furtherance of the public good, 78 the minority viewed the majority's decision
as extending the police power without limit at the private property owner's
expense. The minority contended that prior to the instant case, Mugler and

Euclid were the only exceptions to the absolute protection of property rights
under the fifth amendment.7 7 Accordingly, the minority considered the replacement of the traditional emphasis on protecting the public with the
modern goal of promoting the general welfare unwarranted, particularly in
the context of Mugler and other cases conventionally viewed as prohibitions
of noxious uses.78 Additionally, the minority perceived the extension of permissible zoning from programs in which the landowner benefits substantially
from regulation, as in Euclid, to any comprehensive plan which merely ensures that prescriptions are not arbitrary or discriminatory, as an expansion
of police power restriction without concurrent equitable justification.
The dissent recognized the expanded role of the police power. 79 The
requirement of "just compensation" was not addressed by the Court. Id. See Fair Compensation, supra note 13, at 1039.
75. 98 S. Ct. at 2666 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
76. The dissent clearly reflects the dichotomy of the taking issue. Whereas the
majority focuses initially upon the validity of the regulation through the exercise of police
power, the dissent concentrates on the deprivation of Penn Central's air rights above the
terminal. Id. at 2668. Recognizing that air rights have been previously protected under
the fifth amendment, the dissent saw no reason to depart from such precedent. Id. at 2669
(citing Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (low flying planes held to be a
taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (low flying planes also held to be a
taking); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (projectiles fired over summer resort held a taking)).
77. 98 S. Ct. at 2670.
78. The dissent recognized that the justification for restricting an owner's use of land
without compensation rested on the theory that the public's safety, health and welfare
were greater than the interest of any individual landowner. Id. at 2669-70. Indeed, the
majority relied on cases traditionally classified as "noxious use" prohibitions to exhibit
instances of governmental action which resulted in substantial individualized harm without
compensation. Id. at 2660-61 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (safety
ordinance prohibited commercial excavation); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (trees
felled to prevent danger to state's apple industry); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 US. 394
(1915) (brickyard operation prohibited as inconsistent with surrounding city)) The suggestion by the instant Court that these restrictions could be better viewed as the implementation of policies which produce a widespread public benefit, indicated a willingness to
dispense with simplistic concepts which have proven insufficient to explain judicial results.
For criticism of the noxious use theory, see, e.g., Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking
Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 165, 172-75 (1974); Michelman, Property Utility and Fairness:
Comments on Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 119698.
79. Subject to self-imposed restrictions on the use of police power, governments may
legitimately exercise their power in formulations of laws related to the promotion of the
general welfare. Uninhibited by notions of noxious use and mutual reciprocity of advantage, legislatures can overfly advocate environmental control, aesthetic values and other
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instant case continued the extended application of police power beyond its
80
traditional bounds as initiated in Berman v. Parker.
In recognition of the
complex problems emanating from increasingly concentrated communities
and from concurrent pressure to enhance the quality of citizens' lives, the
majority sanctioned broadened uses of police power in the governmental
formulation of solutions. However, the Court extended equally the responsibility for ensuring that the cost of benefits conferred on the public
are not shouldered individually by private property owners. Thus, the
minority's concern that the expanded use of police power will result in dilution of fifth amendment protection of property s, rights may have been unjustified.
The majority's opinion extended the police power authority without
diminishing the rights of property owners. By discarding conventional
concepts of noxious use 2 and zoning,83 the majority sought to develop an
4
equitable model for balancing the interests affected by social legislation.
The application of this model would still require that the property owner
bear the economic consequences of restrictions placed on the noxious use
of his land.85 Similarly, an equitable proportioning of benefits and burdens
afforded property owners from traditional applications of zoning law"8 reprograms oriented toward enhancement of the quality of life. See Developments, supra note
33, at 1444-57.
80. S48 U.S. 26 (1954). See text accompanying notes 50-54 supra.
81. The tests employed in Pennsylvania Coal to constrain the exercise of police power
have been retained. Both the diminution in value and the balancing of the private harm
with the public good are applied in the instant case. See text accompanying notes 82-88
infra. The extent to which the police power has exceeded its traditional bounds appears
offset by the granting of transfer development rights which would not ordinarily accompany
a non-compensatory exercise of police power. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
82. See note 78 supra.
83. See note 79 supra.
84. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
85. The Court in the instant case 'affirmed the decisions in cases traditionally viewed
as prohibitions of noxious uses of land. See note 78 supra.
86. The New York Court of Appeals stated that "[t]his is not a zoning case." Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 329, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1274, 397
N.Y.S.2d 914, 917 (1977). Comparing the New York Landmark Preservation Law to other
conventional zoning laws, the court noted that the attribute of a common zone, in which
uniform restrictions provided common benefits, was absent. Id. Moreover, the court stated
that landmark restrictions were designed to effect a single piece of property and accordingly
lacked the general community plan implicitly requisite for all zoning ordinances. Id. at 330,
366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918. See Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain and
the Preservation of Historic Property, 63 COLUM. L. Rav. 708, 722-24 (1963).
The instant Court noted that there was no fundamental difference from zoning solely
because it applied to individuals who owned selected properties. 98 S. Ct. at 2663. In comparison, the Court viewed the New York Preservation Law as a comprehensive plan incorporating recognized goals of community development. Furthermore, the plan precluded
arbitrary or discriminatory application and afforded the landowner an opportunity to
challenge the restrictions. Id. at 2664.
Recalling that the property owner in Euclid was perhaps burdened more than his
neighbors, the Court reflected that a zoning law need only be uniformily applied to all
landowners similarly situated, with some concurrent benefit accruing to all. Apparently the
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mains unaltered. Such equitable proportioning is exemplified by the majority's
recognition of the transfer development rights as both an increase in the
benefits" and a mitigation of the burdens88 which are incorporated in New
York City's Landmark Preservation Law.
The salience of the instant case is the opportunity afforded governments
to meet the demands of the future by formulating programs which accommodate all affected interests in the community. 9 Unfortunately, state and
local governments may be misled by what at first blush appears to be an unmitigated extension of the police power. Should local governments fail to

recognize that this additional privilege is accompanied by a new responsibility,
they may enact unbalanced legislation risking the extreme outcome of a
successful constitutional challenge.9 0 The cost of such a misinterpretation is
payment of just compensation measured by the best and full use of the land9
or the abandonment of worthwhile social objectives.
The distinction between eminent domain and police power in the context
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments is a matter of form over substance.
Formalistic conceptions of legal principles have not provided a comprehensible formula 2 for the achievement of fairness and justice.93 The instant
case affords government an alternative to noncompensatory police power and
the power of eminent domain. This third choice94 provides government the
opportunity to ensure that regulations allocate the burdens in a pattern
congruent with the intended benefits. 95
benefit can be de minimus, for the Court did not agree with Penn Central's assertion that
it benefited in no sense from the restriction. Id. at 2665.
87. 98 S. Ct. at 2654 (owners permitted to transfer development rights to other
property).
88. Id. at 2666 (transfer development rights can be sold).
89. New York has had a special relationship with Penn Central spanning more
than half a century. Both have existed symbolically, each benefiting from the development
of the other. Landmark preservation has long been recognized as a national goal. New
York City's attempt to achieve similar objectives has resulted in the formulation of a
program which can be seen as attempting to reach an accommodation of interests. Recent
amendments made to zoning ordinances to enhance the marketability and utilization of
the transfer development rights coupled with the fact that Penn Central's use of the
terminal was not 'affected are indicative of this approach. See The Disparity Issue, supra
note 13. See generally Fair Compensation, supra note 13.
90. See Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 594-96, 350 N.E.2d
381, 394-86, 885 N.Y.S.2d 5,8-9 (1976).
91. The Court may invalidate a law by finding a taking in inverse condemnation proceedings and award "just compensation" to the property owner. See generally Note, Inverse
Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN.
L. REv. 1439 (1974).
92. 98 S.Ct. at 2659. "The question of what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty." Id.
93. Id.
94. Professor Costonis, a leading proponent for providing an alternative to eminent
domain and zoning regulation, termed this approach the "accommodation power." See Fair
Compensation,note 13 supra.
95. A recently enacted Florida statute provides certain state agencies responsible for
environmental regulation with an opportunity to modify restrictions found to be a
taking. In pertinent part the statute provides: "If the court determines the decision reviewed
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